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ARE WE ALL GUILTY?

Article by Federico Grossi

​The international law governing the use of force retains its status as a keystone of the international legal order . Using as a starting point the importance of the “use of force” doctrine in international law the aim of this essay is to examine the application of that doctrine throughout the history of the UN Security Council permanent members. Regard will be given to the use of the veto power and how it would be able to influence the future events in the international law arena if a new and more coherent and effective rule on the use of force will not be forged and applied to the military actions undertaken by Russia in Ukraine and in view of a possible invasion of Taiwan by China. This work will try to show how is it difficult to point a finger against the countries responsible of the contemporary events with knowledge of the past events that involved the other members of the UNSC.

1. The use of the veto power in the Security Council

Ancora 1

​In the context of the Security Council of the UN the veto power could be described as a weapon in the hands of the permanent members of that Council able to block the actions of the whole international community based on the will of one country. The veto power originates in Article 27 of the United Nations Charter  according to which a negative vote from any of the permanent members will block the adoption of a resolution. In most of the cases throughout the history of the UN a failure by the UNSC to authorize the use of force under Chapter VII of the Charter is owed by the interposition of the veto power by the permanent members. According to many that power can be considered to be against the very basic values and goals of the international community, i.e. to protect citizens from their own governments : there is no legal way under the UNSC for third states to intervene and protect citizens from the wrongful actions of their own governments . The ICISS finds it intolerable that “one veto can override the rest of humanity on matters of grave humanitarian concern.” .

Ancora 2

2. The use of force by the permanent members of the UNSC

Under international law it is possible for a State to use force against another State when authorization has been given by the UNSC under Chapter VII of the UN charter, or in self-defense against an armed attack. However, it is worth noting that under article 51 of the UN Charter it is expressly permitted to resort to “collective self-defense”. We will examine more closely the justifications offered in cases such as Libya, Kosovo and Mali which involved the military intervention of some permanent members of the UNSC.

3. Lybia

Ancora 3

In 2015 the fear that the terrorist organization might take control of Libya led to the concern of the international community and to the expansion of the military intervention against ISIL from Iraq and Syria to Libya. According to international law the intervention is legal if it does not violate self-determination. The intervention by invitation theory shall be coupled with the complementary “purpose-based approach” since the consensual intervention is limited to the realization of objectives such as to support the government to maintain law and order. Moreover, it is not possible to invoke those theories when a civil war is taking place in the country that issues the invitation. When the Egyptian government took military action on the territory of Libya, “no member criticized the airstrikes or the legal argument of consensual military intervention”. On November 2015 the US intervened with a military action in Libya but did not provide any legal justification for this action because the Western powers have been reluctant considering that a prerequisite for such a military intervention is the establishment of a national unity government in Libya”. What really happened in the case of Libya was that states leveraged the possibility of a military intervention by invitation to politically accelerate the solution of the Libyan civil war, as it is clear looking at the position and statements of the US, the UNSC and NATO.

4. Kosovo

Ancora 4

As professor Sur said “the 1999 use of force in Kosovo by several NATO members was justified more by its legitimacy than by its legality: it was a fair war but not a lawful one.” In 1999 in response to an attempt by the government of Serbia to carry out ethnic cleansing against the Kosovar population an international coalition led by the US military intervened in those territories. However, it was not possible to claim that they acted based on a right of collective self-defense because the air strikes were not in response to an armed attack against a member state of the UN. Moreover, according to the North Atlantic Treaty 1949 NATO member states must “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force”. The unauthorized military actions undertaken were considered illegal under the UN Charter but NATO justified its use of force as a response to the “unrestrained assault” by Yugoslav military forces. According to the European Union, there is a “moral duty”, not explicitly legal, to end a violence and the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo. The Kosovo precedent and the humanitarian intervention argument could be used by states to circumvent the Security Council and defend their political and economic interests, like Putin himself did in the context of the Crimean crisis in 2014 when he referred to the Kosovo precedent as “a precedent our western colleagues created with their own hands in a very similar situation”.

 5. Mali

Ancora 5

After France started its military intervention in Mali, nobody raised a single protest concerning this intervention and, on the contrary, the number of expressions of support was overwhelming. No State doubted the legality of the French intervention in Mali. France proposed three arguments to justify its military attacks, which shows that France may be “down to a concern that none of them is capable by itself of providing sufficient justification for the intervention, but that the combination of all three might”. However, the self-defense justification still appears to be problematic: to exercise self-defense, there must be an armed attack by one State against another. As the ICJ pointed out in DRC v Uganda “in the case of the French intervention in Mali it is crystal clear that there is no armed attack against Mali by another State”. However, since not a single member of the UNSC opposed to the intervention of France in the context of the Mali crisis, it could be possible to argue that State practice has evolved and sustain Judge Koojmans’ argument who found it “unreasonable to deny the attacked State the right to self-defense merely because there is no attacker State”.

In most of the cases the actions undertaken by the member states of the UNSC were not fully lawful but still “tolerated” by the international community or justified by reference to new doctrines developed on cornerstones principle of international law and sometimes pre-emptory jus cogens norms. 

 

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6. The need for a more coherent rule

The hostilities between Russia and Ukraine were clear since 2014, when Russian military forces began an invasion of Crimea and later declared the accession to the Russian Federation. However, starting from February 2022 tensions between Ukraine and Russia “reached their peak”. To justify the invasion of Ukraine President Putin tried to evoke a parallel with the Kosovo case by accusing Ukraine of committing genocide in eastern Ukraine. However, “there was nothing close to an impending humanitarian catastrophe in Eastern Ukraine”.  What is important in the context of the Russia violation of the UN Charter is that those violations are being perpetuated by a permanent member of the UNSC that is considered under article 24 of the Charter to have the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”. 

Another threat is about to become real: Beijing has pledged to annex Taiwan under a disputed claim that it is a Chinese province. However, Taiwan sees itself as distinct from China, with its own constitution and leaders. According to China, Taiwan was originally a Chinese province, but the Taiwanese point to the same historical background to argue that they have never been part of the modern Chinese state. The tensions raise international concern: in any military confrontation China’s armed forces “would dwarf those of Taiwan” and in the event of an armed conflict the US would be ready to defend Taiwan as President Biden made clear. As Saul noted “China too has learned from the West that power lets you create rules to suit yourself, and bend or ignore rules that don’t”.

Considering these major international events, it is clear how important it is for the international community to forge a new rule on the use of force which would be able to sanction state parties that breach the Charter without the risk of those actions being blocked by the exercise of the veto power by one country. What is needed is a rule that can make clear that the UN strongly condemns those actions. Impunity in these circumstances is a big danger: if a State is strong in the knowledge that no sanctions will be imposed because the UNSC will be paralyzed by the exercise of the veto power, it will feel free to act freely. A new rule is required under the UN Charter to make States accountable of war crimes and punishable with the heaviest sanction. It is necessary to create a rule which would be capable of having deterrent effect, making the benefits outweighed by the costs in terms of reaction of the international community. 

Ancora 6

Conclusion

Even before the drafting of the UN Charter the first attempts to violate the wars after the experience of WW1 seemed to be very weak: when Italy attacked Abyssinia in 1935 “a firm international reaction would have been necessary in order to save the still young prohibition of war from a loss of authority”, as professor Münkler highlights. With the UN Charter, the weakness of that rule has remained one of its features, so that UN states have been capable to circumvent the Charter and the UNSC resolutions using violence against other states in front of the “blind” eyes of the international community. Notwithstanding the atrocity of the military actions undertaken by Russia in Ukraine and notwithstanding the absence of any justification for the threats of China against Taiwan, “we must also look in the mirror”. When we look in that mirror, the image we can see is the one of the permanent member states of the UNSC engaging in unlawful military actions in several states, masquerading those actions under the veil of necessity, depicting themselves as the heroes rescuing populations from violations of human rights, but instead pursuing their deepest economic and political self-interests. US, British and Australian war crimes against civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq have largely gone unpunished; the US and UK are still selling weapons to Saudi Arabia. Are all these acts different from the treatment that Ukrainian refugees have received?

If a new, more effective, and coherent rule on the use of force is not to be created and applied to cases as Russia or China to make them accountable under international law, under the current framework it would not be possible for the other countries to argue a breach of international law: they should be found “not guilty” before pointing the finger against other States. 

Bibliografia e sitografia

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